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This paper presents a principal-agent model where the agent has multiple, or
imprecise, beliefs. We model this situation formally by assuming the agent's pref-
erences are incomplete. One can interpret this multiplicity as an agent's limited
knowledge of the surrounding environment. In this setting, incentives need to be
robust to the agent's di®erent beliefs. We study whether robustness implies simplic-
ity. Under mild conditions, we show the unique optimal contract has a two-wage
structure; a °at payment and bonus. That is, all output levels are divided into
two groups, and the optimal incentive scheme pays the same amount for all output
levels in each group. We also show that a two-state two-action framework can be
thought of as a reduced form of the original model. We solve explicitly the prin-
cipal's problem in this case, and discuss some implications of our model for ¯rm
ownership.
JEL Codes: D82, D81, D23
1 Introduction
In some principal-agent settings, the agent may have multiple, or `imprecise', beliefs.
This imprecision arises because the agent is not con¯dent in assessing the possible
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
consequences of his actions. We discuss the characteristics of an incentive scheme in
such settings. The main conclusion is that optimal incentive schemes are simple. In
particular, we show that the optimal contract takes only two values across all possible
output states.
The moral hazard model sometimes generates extremely complex incentive struc-
tures. Optimal contracts often involve as many di®erent payments as there are possible
levels of output. In addition, small changes in the assumed distribution of outcomes
can lead to large changes in the way an optimal scheme depends on output; that is,
in its shape. Casual empiricism, on the other hand, suggests that many contracts are
quite simple. For example, many labor contracts have a simple two-wage structure: a
°at payment plus an \incentive bonus" at the end of the year. Why is this structure
so common across di®erent environments? The standard model's answer is that all of
them must share the same stochastic structure of output.
Some authors have speculated that contracts are simple because they need to be
robust. Hart and Holmstrom [1987], for example, argue that real world incentives need
to perform well across a wider range of circumstances than the ones accounted for
in the standard model. Once this need for robustness is considered, simple optimal
schemes might obtain. We follow this path by introducing a particular robustness
requirement. Suppose the agent lacks con¯dence in judging the stochastic properties of
the environment he operates in. This is re°ected by non-unique beliefs about possible
output levels. An incentive scheme which accounts for this problem is necessarily robust
to the agent's di®erent beliefs. In this framework, we show the optimal scheme often
has a two-wage structure. Thus, the need for robustness we examine generates simple
contracts. Furthermore, these contracts have a shape we commonly observe in the real
world.1
The following example illustrates the kind of situation we have in mind. Ustica
University is considering whether to make Luca a job o®er. If they hire him, Ustica
cannot observe how much e®ort Luca puts into teaching and advising students. The
only way the university can gauge Luca's e®ort is the quality of jobs found by his
advisees. Luca, however, cannot precisely evaluate the impact of his work on student
placement. This depends on his e®ort, but also on many variables beyond his control:
the admissions procedure, the career o±ce, pure luck, and so on. Luca has no previous
experience at Ustica. Thus, he does not feel con¯dent evaluating the relation between
the e®ort he puts in his work and the output produced. Ustica, however, directly
controls some of these variables and can evaluate this relation more precisely.
In this relationship the agent is an outsider and is not familiar with all the details
of the production process. The principal is an insider and is familiar with these details.
1Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987] provide conditions under which linear incentive schemes are optimal.
These conditions include constant relative risk aversion and a speci¯c dynamic property of stochastic
output. Neither of these requirements is related to the idea of robustness stated above. We allow the
agent to consider many stochastic structures of output. We also adopt a di®erent notion of simplicity.
A two-wage scheme is simple because it can be thought of as contingent on only two events; a linear
contract is simple because it is contingent on an intercept and a slope for all events.
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The principal is at an informational disadvantage because she cannot observe the agent's
e®ort choice, but the agent is entering a new environment and cannot evaluate precisely
the consequences of his work. The agent's behavior may re°ect the uncertainty he faces.
The standard principal-agent model, however, neglects this possibility. It assumes both
parties can precisely evaluate the stochastic consequences of the agent's action.
We model this situation formally by relaxing the assumption that an agent's prefer-
ences are complete. In this case, the agent may be unable to compare alternatives o®ered
to him. Aumann [1962] and Bewley [1986] showed that incomplete preferences can be
represented by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with multiple probability
distributions. This multiplicity can be thought of as imprecision of the agent's beliefs
over uncertain outcomes. The agent computes an expected utility for each distribution,
and they all matter in determining his behavior. One interpretation of this multiplicity
follows Knight [1921]. Individuals use a single distribution only when they regard events
as risky; individuals use a set of distributions when they regard events as uncertain.
The term Knightian uncertainty has been associated with the latter situation.
A question that arises with incomplete preference models is what do individuals do
when all alternatives are incomparable. Bewley's [1986] and [1989] inertia assumption
states that, when faced with incomparable options, an individual sticks with his current
behavior, the status quo, unless an alternative is strictly preferred. This `uncertainty
aversion' re°ects reluctance to change behavior when the consequences of doing so are
di±cult to evaluate. In abstract settings, de¯ning the status quo is sometimes hard.
This may be one reason why Bewley's model is di±cult to apply. In our setting, however,
there is a natural candidate for the status quo, the agent's outside option.
We consider the following moral hazard model. A risk-neutral principal has to
design an incentive scheme for a risk-neutral agent who has imprecise beliefs over output
outcomes. These beliefs are represented by sets of probability distributions, one set for
each action. We assume risk-neutrality to focus on the impact of Knightian uncertainty
alone. Therefore, multiplicity of beliefs is the only di®erence between our model and
a risk-neutral version of Grossman and Hart [1983]. The principal cannot observe the
agent's action. Each action has a di®erent disutility to the agent and induces di®erent
beliefs over output outcomes. For each action, the principal designs a contract which
implements it at the lowest possible expected cost. Then, she selects the action that
maximizes the di®erence between expected output and expected cost.
If agents have imprecise beliefs but do not satisfy the inertia assumption, it is often
impossible for the principal to induce the agent to take a privately costly action such as
hard work. For an incentive scheme to implement a particular action, the agent must
prefer that action to his reservation utility and to all other actions. The agent, however,
regards any two actions whose belief sets intersect as not comparable. Thus, an action
can only be implemented if the agent's belief set corresponding to it does not intersect
any of the belief sets corresponding to the other actions.
In many interesting situations, however, the agent's beliefs intersect. For example,
if the agent chooses the lowest e®ort action, his beliefs may be extremely imprecise
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but the harder the agent works, the more precisely he evaluates his in°uence on the
production process. In this case, all agent's belief sets intersect and, according to the
above result, no action can be implemented.
Implementation is easier when the agent satis¯es the inertia assumption. With
inertia, an incentive scheme implements an action if this action is preferred to the
reservation utility and, for each other action, either the ¯rst action is preferred, or the
other action is not comparable to the reservation utility. Preferring one action to all
others is no longer necessary. With the inertia assumption, implementing an action is
sometimes possible even if the agent's belief sets intersect as in the example above.
Optimal contracts under imprecise beliefs are both robust and simple. Regardless
of inertia, an optimal contract is robust because it provides incentives for the entire set
of probability distributions the agent considers. Under mild conditions on the agent's
imprecise beliefs, the unique optimal incentive scheme divides all the possible outputs
levels into two groups and pays the same amount in all states belonging to the same
group. First, we prove the result when the agent can choose between two actions.
Then, we generalize it to the case in which many actions are available to him. Consider
the following example. Suppose the number of events a contract is contingent upon
is increased by one because the principal decides to make di®erent payments in two
output levels that previously corresponded to the same wage. In other words, one event
is divided into two separate events. Risk-neutrality implies the agent does not place
any premium on receiving di®erent payments. Satisfying the constraints is now more
di±cult, however, because the new events have, in general, di®erent probabilities for
di®erent elements of the agent's belief sets. Thus, dividing events makes it more di±cult
to provide incentives. Conversely, the formal proof shows that joining events is strictly
pro¯table for the principal. Under mild assumptions, this result holds, regardless of
the number of output levels, provided this number is ¯nite. Additional restrictions
guarantee it also holds for any ¯nite number of actions available to the agent.
Given this result, the two-action two-state version of the model is a reduced form
of the more general formulation. We explicitly solve the principal's problem in this
case. We ¯nd the optimal incentive scheme with and without inertia. With inertia, we
show the agent is unwilling to buy the ¯rm from the principal at a price the principal
would accept. Thus, contrary to the standard model, the agency problem cannot be
avoided even if the agent is risk-neutral and has unlimited wealth. This result suggests
a possible theory of the ¯rm. Firm owners (principals) are the individuals who face less
Knightian uncertainty. Workers (agents) are the individuals who face more Knightian
uncertainty.
Recently, much attention has been devoted to incomplete contracts. For example,
see Hart and Moore [1988], Tirole [1994], and Hart [1995]. Tirole argues robustness (in
the sense of limited knowledge of the surrounding environment) should be investigated
as a source of incomplete contracts. Our main result does not deal with this problem
explicitly, but suggests Knightian uncertainty as a useful tool. Asymmetric con¯dence
in beliefs introduces an uncertainty cost in contracts. This cost may depend positively
2 INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES AND INERTIA 5
on the number of events the contract is contingent upon. Therefore, it can be reduced
by making the contract depend on fewer events. If this is the case, incomplete prefer-
ence may generate contracts that are incomplete in the sense that they depend on few
contingencies.
Mukerji [1994] and Ghirardato [1994] present moral hazard models similar in mo-
tivation to the one we describe. The decision theoretic model they use, however, is
di®erent from ours. In both cases, the principal and the agent are Choquet expected
utility maximizers (see Schmeidler [1989]). Choquet expected utility is a complete pref-
erence model in which, loosely speaking, lack of con¯dence and uncertainty are re°ected
by the non-additivity of beliefs, not by the imprecision of beliefs. Furthermore, in both
these papers, unlike ours, lack of con¯dence is assumed to be symmetric across the
parties involved.
The next section introduces some concepts of individual decision making when pref-
erences are incomplete. Section 3 presents the basic framework and discusses the imple-
mentation rules. Section 4 proves that optimal incentive schemes are simple. Section 5
solves the two-state two-action problem explicitly and explores some characteristics of
the optimal contracts. Section 6 concludes.
2 Incomplete Preferences and Inertia
We describe brie°y individuals' behavior when their preferences are not necessarily
complete, and then introduce the inertia assumption. This approach to decision making
was pioneered by Bewley [1986], and further developed in Bewley [1987] and Bewley
[1989]. Incompleteness modi¯es Savage's expected utility framework to account for
multiple probability distributions. The purpose of the inertia assumption, which states
that an alternative is chosen only if it is preferred to current behavior, is to explain
some choices between incomparable alternatives.
2.1 Preference Representation without Completeness
If a preference ordering satis¯es the completeness axiom, the decision maker can com-
pare any two random payo®s and decide which one is better based on their respective
expected utilities. Von Neumann and Morgenstern were the ¯rst to observe how com-
pleteness is not an entirely satisfactory axiom:
It is conceivable -and may even in a way be more realistic- to allow for cases
where the individual is neither able to state which of two alternatives he
prefers nor that they are equally desirable...How real this possibility is, both
for individuals and for organizations, seems to be an extremely interesting
question...It certainly deserves further study.2
2Von Neumann-Morgenstern [1947], Section 3.3.4, pg. 19.
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If a preference ordering does not satisfy completeness, the decision maker is not
necessarily able to compute a unique expected utility for each payo®. Incompleteness is
re°ected by multiplicity of beliefs. Therefore, the individual computes many expected
utilities for each payo®. Let x and y be random monetary payo®s de¯ned over some state
space, and let ¢ be a closed and convex set whose elements are subjective probability
distributions. Then, when preferences are not complete, we say
x is preferred to y if and only if E±[u(x)] > E±[u(y)] for all ± in ¢ (1)
where u(¢) is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility derived from the payo®s.3 If the
set ¢ has only one member, the preference ordering is complete, and the usual rep-
resentation obtains. When the relevant state-space has only N elements, (1) reduces
to:






±iu (yi) for all ± in ¢
Bewley [1986] argues expression (1) is a possible formulation of Frank Knight's
[1921] distinction between risk and uncertainty. A payo® is risky when the probabilities
of di®erent outcomes are known; if they are unknown, the payo® is uncertain. Hence,
payo®s are risky when ¢ has only one member and uncertain otherwise. Informally, the
number of distributions in ¢ gauges the amount of uncertainty the individual perceives.
Thus, the size of this set tells us how much imprecision there is in the decision maker's
beliefs; it can be thought of as measuring con¯dence in beliefs.
A related interpretation focuses more on the de¯nition of subjective probabilities.
Savage [1954] admits that in some instances one can think of subjective probabilities
as vague.4 More recently, Walley [1991] proposes an axiomatic theory which does not
assume probabilities are precise. Individuals assess multiple probabilities for random
events.5 In general, their beliefs are not represented by a unique measure. According
to Walley , uncertainty is the correct way to think about probabilities, and risk is a
special case.
2.2 The Inertia Assumption
When preferences are not complete, we cannot explain choice among incomparable
alternatives. If x is chosen when y is available, we cannot say x is revealed preferred to
y; we can only say y is not revealed preferred to x. To address this problem, Bewley
[1986] introduces the concepts of status quo and inertia. The inertia assumption states
3Theorem 1.1 in Bewley [1986] derives the existence of ¢ in the linear utility case, and Theorem 1.2
derives the existence of ¢ and the utility function; a similar result is found in Aumann [1962].
4Cf. Savage [1954], pg. 59.
5In Section 2.3.3 Walley de¯nes the basic entity of his theory, the lower prevision P , as a real-valued
function de¯ned on some class of gambles K, satis¯yng the following axioms: (P1) P (X) ¸ infX when X
belongs to K; (P2) P (¸X) = ¸P (X) when X belongs to K and ¸ > 0; (P3) P (X + Y ) ¸ P (X) + P (Y )
when X and Y belong to K. Later on, Section 3.8.3, he shows that completeness of preference and
precision of probabilities are equivalent. For more details, see Walley [1991].
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that planned behavior, the status quo, is abandoned only for alternatives preferred to
it. Therefore, if x is chosen when y is available and y is the status quo, x is revealed
preferred to y. If an additional choice z is also available, but z is not preferred to y,
the individual still chooses x. However, x is not thereby revealed preferred to z.
In many economic contexts, there is a natural candidate for the status quo. For
example, consider a bargaining game in which each player has an outside option. If we
interpret these options as the players' actions before entering the game, de¯ning each
player's outside option as his status quo seems natural. In the moral hazard model that
follows, the status quo corresponds to the agent's reservation utility. This is the payo®
the agent receives if he rejects the contract the principal o®ers. We interpret it as the
reward corresponding to the agent's planned behavior before the possibility of dealing
with the principal materialized.
3 The Moral Hazard Setup
We present a moral hazard model where the agent is less con¯dent in beliefs than
the principal. Formally, the agent's preferences are not complete and the principal's
preferences are complete. Because the inertia assumption is somewhat arbitrary, we
establish conditions for a contract to implement some action with and without inertia.
We show this has di®erent implications for the model; namely, the latter case imposes
undesirable restrictions. Finally, we de¯ne an optimal incentive scheme, and derive
some of its basic properties.
The principal owns resources that yield output. An agent has to perform some
action for production to take place. The principal and the agent observe the realized
output level, but the principal cannot observe the action performed by the agent. An
incentive scheme is a contract that induces the agent to perform a particular action.
N states of nature are distinguished by the amount of output produced. Output
is an N-vector denoted by y = (y1; ::; yN), with yN > :: > y1. An incentive scheme
is an N-vector denoted by w = (w1; ::; wN ), where the payment from the principal
to the agent is wj in state j. The agent chooses an action a from a discrete set of
available actions A ´ f1; 2; ::;Mg, interpreted as e®ort levels. The agent's reservation
utility, or outside option, is w. It represents the reward the agent receives from his
current behavior, the status quo. Throughout, we use subscripts to denote states and
superscripts to denote actions. Each action has two consequences: it imposes a cost on
the agent, measured by disutility of e®ort, and it generates beliefs about the likelihood
of di®erent output levels.
Let ¼a be the principal's beliefs induced by action a; ¼a is a probability distrib-
ution over possible output levels. Let ¢a be the agent's beliefs induced by action a;
¢a is a closed and convex set whose elements, denoted ±a, are probability distributions
over the possible output levels. More formally, we assume that the principal's beliefs are
described by a function ¼ : A ! P, and the agent's beliefs are described by a correspon-
dence ¢ : A ! P, where P ´
n
x 2 <N jx ¸ 0; PNi=1 xi = 1
o
denotes all the probability
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distributions over y. This description follows the parametrized distribution formulation
of the principal-agent problem pioneered by Holmstrom [1979]. Our innovation is not
to restrict ¢ to being a function.
We assume ¼ and ¢ are common knowledge. We also assume the principal's prob-
ability distribution agrees with one of the agent's distributions; formally, for each a in
A, ¼a is an element of ¢a. There is asymmetric con¯dence in beliefs. The principal is
more con¯dent in evaluating the stochastic relationship between the agent's e®ort and
output. This is the most relevant feature of the model, and uniqueness of the principal's
beliefs is assumed for analytical tractability. Most of the analysis would be the same
if ¼a were to be a correspondence, as long as one maintains asymmetric con¯dence.
Finally, ¼a being an element of ¢a rules out asymmetric information in the standard
sense; one of the agent's priors agrees with the principal's prior.











i yi whenever a > a
0. More expensive actions increase
the expected value of output. Both assumptions are standard in the principal-agent
literature.
The principal and the agent are risk-neutral. The agent's utility, denoted UA, is
the expected value of the contract minus the cost of the action he performs. The agent
computes many expected values, one for each probability distribution in the belief set
induced by the chosen action. His behavior depends on all of them. Formally, for each
±a in ¢a, the agent's utility is:
UA(w; a; ±a) ´ E±a [w] ¡ ca =
NX
j=1
±ajwj ¡ ca (2)
The principal's utility, denoted UP , is the expected value of output minus the expected
cost of the contract. These expectations are computed according to the probability
distribution induced by the e®ort level chosen by the agent. Formally, the principal's
utility is:







The set up parallels the standard principal-agent model. There, the principal is
assumed risk-neutral while the agent is assumed risk-averse. Both parties have the same
beliefs, and the same attitude toward uncertainty, but they evaluate risk in di®erent
ways. In our model, both parties have the same beliefs, and evaluate risk in the same
way, but they have di®erent attitudes toward uncertainty.
When the agent's action is observable (and/or veri¯able), the principal can make
the contract contingent on it. De¯ne the cost of this incentive scheme as CaFB, where
FB stands for ¯rst-best. As in the standard model, CaFB = w + c
a; the principal gets
the agent to pick a by o®ering a contract that says: in every state, I'll pay you CaFB if
you choose a, ¡1 otherwise.6
6More precisely, the principal needs to add a (small) amount to convince the agent to pick a. From
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3.1 Two Implementation Rules
The principal wants the agent to perform a speci¯c action a¤. Because she cannot ob-
serve the agent, she must rely on the contract alone to provide the desired incentives.
Obviously, di®erent assumptions about the agent's behavior imply di®erent require-
ments the contract must satisfy. In any case, these requirements must leave no doubts
the agent's choice is a¤. A contract is a take-it-or-leave-it o®er, and we say a con-
tract implements a¤ if the agent accepts the contract and chooses a¤ among all possible
actions.
3.1.1 Implementing without inertia
Without inertia, a contract implements a¤ if it satis¯es the conditions one imposes in
the standard model, modi¯ed to take multiplicity of beliefs into account. The agent
participates if a¤ is preferred to the reservation utility, and chooses a¤ if this action is
preferred to all others.
De¯nition 1 An incentive scheme w implements a¤ when:





j wj ¡ ca
¤ ¸ w (P)












j wj ¡ ca
0 8±a0 in ¢a0 (IC)
In words, for any probability distributions induced by a¤, the expected utility the
agent receives from the contract must be weakly higher than the reservation utility,
and weakly higher than the expected utility calculated according to all probability
distributions induced by any other action.
The implementation requirements imposed by De¯nition 1 are restrictive. In par-
ticular, there could be many actions that cannot be implemented.
Proposition 1 Without inertia, if the belief sets induced by any two actions have an
element in common, one of them cannot be implemented.
Proof. Let the two actions be a and a0 and, without loss of generality, assume a > a0.
Suppose the claim does not hold. Then, there exist an incentive scheme w satisfying De-
¯nition 1 and a probability distribution ± that belongs to both ¢a and ¢a
0
. Therefore,
(IC) must be satis¯ed when ± appears on both sides of the inequality:
NX
j=1





here on, we assume she always does so when necessary.
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This implies ca · ca0 , and contradicts a > a0.
When two belief sets intersect the corresponding actions are not comparable. A
possible implication of Proposition 1 is that, when the number of actions is large, only
few could be implementable. In particular, no action whose belief set intersects the
belief set of a cheaper action can satisfy De¯nition 1. This problem is mitigated by
using the inertia assumption.
3.1.2 Implementing with inertia
The inertia assumption says an alternative is chosen only if it is preferred to the status
quo. This can be used to de¯ne a su±cient condition for an action not to be chosen:
an action not comparable to the reservation utility is not chosen. After an incentive
scheme is proposed by the principal, the agent faces two basic decisions: does he accept
the o®er and if yes, which action does he choose? By rejecting, the agent opts for the
outside option, the status quo. This corresponds to the agent's behavior before the
contractual o®er was made available to him, that is, the agent's reservation utility.
Inertia is thus useful to de¯ne the requirements an incentive scheme must satisfy to
implement a¤. Suppose a¤ and a0 are not comparable, but the ¯rst is preferred to the
status quo while the second is not. Then, the inertia assumption implies a¤ is chosen.
Therefore, an incentive scheme does not need to make a¤ preferred to all other actions.
De¯nition 2 If the inertia assumption holds, an incentive scheme w implements a¤ in
A if :





j wj ¡ ca
¤ ¸ w (P)












j wj ¡ ca






j wj ¡ ca
0 · w for some ±a0 in ¢a0 (NC)
NC is a non comparability constraint. It says there exists at least one probability
distribution induced by a0 such that the expected utility the agent derives from the
contract is weakly lower than the reservation utility.
Inertia eases the implementation conditions. All incentive schemes that satisfy De-
¯nition 1 also satisfy De¯nition ??. Intuitively, an incentive scheme does not need
to make a¤ the most preferred action, but only to guarantee no alternative to a¤ is
attractive enough for the agent.
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3.2 The principal's problem
The principal maximizes her expected utility. We can divide her problem into two steps.
First, for each action, ¯nd the cheapest contract which implements it. Second, decide
which action to implement.7 For a given action a, let H1(a) be the set of all incentive
schemes which satisfy De¯nition 1, and H2(a) the set of all incentive schemes which
satisfy De¯nition ??. We say bwa is an optimal incentive scheme to implement a when






where i = f1; 2g depending on whether we assume the agent's behavior satis¯es the




j bwaj when Hi(a) is not empty,
and C(a; i) = ¡1 otherwise. C(a; i) is the expected cost of the optimal scheme to





¼aj yj ¡ C(a; i)
As noted before, H1(a) is a (possibly empty) subset of H2(a). As a consequence,
the principal cannot be worse o® if the agent obeys the inertia assumption. Because of
the linearity of the problem, existence of a solution is not an issue as long as the Hi(a)
are not empty. Our main objective is to analyze the characteristics of the solutions to
(4), and to ¯nd conditions for them to be simple.
3.3 Some characteristics of the optimal incentive scheme
The agent's behavior depends on all the probability distributions in his beliefs set.
Some of them, though, are more relevant for our analysis because they trigger his
behavior. For any ¯xed action a let e¢(w;a) ´
½








Then, given the contract w, e±a is a probability distribution yielding its lowest expected
value for the agent when he chooses action a. A contract w satis¯es the participation
constraint for action a if and only if this constraint is satis¯ed for elements of e¢(w;a).
A contract w satis¯es the non comparability constraint for action a0 if and only if this
constraint is satis¯ed for elements of e¢(w;a0). For any ¯xed action a let ee¢(w;a) ´½
ee±
a













yielding its highest expected value for the agent when he chooses action a. A contract
w satis¯es the incentive compatibility constraint for action a versus a0 if and only if this
7The two-step procedure is not necessarily correct if the principal has non-unique beliefs, for one
needs to check more carefully whether the principal's problem is separable. For an example, see Ghi-
rardato [1994].
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constraint is satis¯ed for elements of e¢(w;a) and ee¢(w;a0) on the left and right side
respectively..
The following proposition specializes to our framework some results about the op-
timal contract which hold in the standard model.
Proposition 2 Let a be the action the principal wants to implement, and let cWa be
the set of solutions to (4).
(i) The participation constraint binds when computed according to e±a; formally,
PN
j=1
e±aj bwaj ¡ ca = w
for any bwa 2 cWa.
(ii) If a is the least costly action, the scheme that pays w + c1 in all states is a solution
to (4); that is, a = 1 implies bw1 = w + c1 2 cW 1.
(iii) if a is not the least costly action, there exists an action less costly than a such that













e±a0j bwaj ¡ ca
0
= w
for any bwa 2 cWa.
Proof.
(i). Suppose not. Then, bwa is optimal and PNj=1 e±aj bwaj ¡ ca > w. Reduce the payment
in each state by " > 0; that is, for all j, let ewj = bwaj ¡ ". For " small enough, ewj









j bwaj ¡ ", contradicting the optimality of bwa.






j . The scheme wj = w + c
1 for all j is feasible: it satis¯es (P), and it satis¯es
(IC) because alternative actions are more costly for the agent. It is a solution to (4)






(iii). Suppose the claim does not hold. That is, bwa is optimal and for each a0 < a
PN
j=1

















. The latter inequality implies
PN
j=1
e±a0j bwaj ¡ ca
0
< w. Because
none of the respective constraints binds, bwa is a solution for a problem like (4) where
all actions like a0 have been dropped from the constraints. In this new problem, a is
the least costly action and a contract that pays w + ca in all states is optimal. Thus,











e±a0j bwaj . Hence, the two inequalities above
both imply ca
0
> ca contradicting a0 < a.
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4 Optimal Incentive Schemes Are Simple
This section contains the main result. We establish mild conditions for an optimal
incentive scheme to be simple. Under these conditions, the solution to (4) divides the
N possible states into two groups, and pays the same amount in all states belonging to
the each group. The optimal contract distinguishes only between two events: it has a
two-wage structure. First, we prove the result when the agent can choose only between
two actions. Second, we introduce many actions and show how our result generalizes
to this case.
Theorists have conjectured that contracts are simple because they need to be robust.
Hart and Holmstrom [1987] argue that, in the real world, a contract must provide
incentives across a wider range of circumstances than the ones the standard model
considers. The idea of robustness we use represents one way to model this requirement.
A di®erent approach is used in Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987]. They provide conditions
for an optimal scheme to be linear. These are not related our idea of robustness.
Furthermore, we adopt a di®erent notion of simplicity. A two-wage scheme is simple
because it can be thought of as contingent on only two events.
The main result depends on two characteristics of the beliefs of the parties involved
in the contract. Before stating them, we need some additional notation. Let S, with
generic element s, be the set of all subsets of 1:::N . For each action a, a convex capacity
is a function va : S ! [0; 1] such that: (i) va(;) = 0, (ii) va(S) = 1, (iii) 8s; s0 2 S,
s µ s0 implies va(s) · va(s0), and (iv) 8s; s0 2 S, v(s [ s0) ¸ v(s) + v(s0) ¡ v(s \ s0).8
The assumptions we need are:
A-1: For each action a in A, there exists a convex capacity va such that:
¢a = f±a in P j ±a (s) ¸ va (s) for each s in Sg (5)
where P =
n
x 2 <N jx ¸ 0;PNi=1 xi = 1
o
.
A-2: For each action a in A, ¼a belongs to the interior of ¢a.
A-2 makes more stringent the condition that the agent's belief sets contain an ele-
ment corresponding to the principal's beliefs. For each action, A-1 places restrictions
on the image of the correspondence ¢. Geometrically, ¢a must be a polyhedron whose
boundaries are determined by the linear inequalities in (5). Figure 1 displays some ex-
amples when belief sets are subsets of the two-dimensional simplex. ¢A and ¢B satisfy
A-2, ¢C does not.
A-1 says that ¢a must be the core of some convex capacity. In the context of the
literature on Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler [1989]), a capacity is interpreted as a
non-additive probability, and convexity is assumed in many applications.9 For example,
both Mukerji [1994] and Ghirardato [1994] assume the beliefs of both parties involved in
a moral hazard model are represented by convex capacities. We use a di®erent decision
8va is often called a non-additive probability.
9This connection includes the literature on maxmin expected utility developed in Gilboa and Schmei-
dler [1986].






















Figure 1: Agent's Beliefs with 3 Output States
theory but, in a loose sense, we are not imposing more restrictive assumptions on the
agent's beliefs than they do. A-2 represents a stronger di®erence between our model
and theirs. In words, we assume asymmetric con¯dence in beliefs.
The ¯rst assumption is particularly useful in describing the agent's behavior when
he is o®ered a contract. Intuitively, this depends on the lowest and highest expectation
he can compute for any given contract. As the following Lemma shows, under A-1
one can characterize the probability distributions that correspond to these `extreme'
expectations.10
Lemma 3 Let va be a convex capacity, and let e¢a, with generic element e±a, be the set










s for each j = 2; ::;N .
Proof. See Chateneuf and Ja®ray [1989], Propositions 10 and 13.
From this Lemma, we can conclude that under A-1 and A-2 the lowest expectation





1 ¸ ¼a1 . Another consequence of Lemma 3 is the following corollary.
Corollary 4 Let z and z0 be two an N-vector such that z1 · :: · zN and z01 · :: · z0N .






10Thanks to Matthew Ryan for pointing out this result to me.









Proof. We can always write
NX
j=1


























j = 2; ::; N . Because z and z0 are ordered in the same way both minimization problems
yield the same solution.
In words this corollary says the lowest expectation of any two payments which have
the same ordering is attained by the same distribution. This is the tool we need to
prove the main result.
4.1 Simplicity with two actions
In this section, we specialize the framework to the case in which the agent can choose
only among two actions, H and L. We interpret them as high and low e®ort respectively;
hence, cH > cL. As seen previously, the principal can implement the low e®ort action at
the ¯rst best cost with a contract which promises the same payment in every state. A
more interesting problem arises when the principal wants to implement the high e®ort
action. The result is that the optimal contract to do that is two-valued.
The main result is the following.
Proposition 5 Assume A-1 and A-2 hold. Let the set of all contracts that implement
H against L be non-empty. Then, the unique optimal incentive scheme to implement
H divides the N states in two groups and pays the same amount in all states belonging
to each group.
This Proposition does not depend on which de¯nition of implementation is used.
We provide the details of the proof for the case in which the agent obeys the inertia
assumption. The other case can be proved very similarly. Loosely, the following example
drives the argument. Consider a contract contingent on only two groups of output
levels. Suppose the principal divides the group of output levels corresponding to one
payment into two, and makes two di®erent payments in each group. By Lemma 1, the
distribution yielding the agent's extreme expectation of the old contract also yields an
extreme expectation of the new one. This extreme distribution, though, determines
only the aggregate probability of the two new payments. Given this probability, the
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lowest expectation of the new contract assigns the smallest weight to the largest of the
two new payments. Therefore, the new contract is not as e±cient as the old one to
provide incentives.
Proof.
The main step in the proof is to show, by contradiction, than an optimal contract
cannot be contingent on more than two groups of output levels.
De¯ne a partition of the state space such that each element in this partition corre-
sponds to di®erent payments in the optimal contract bw (in this subsection we drop the
superscript in denoting the optimal contract). Let k be an element of this partition;
we say k is an event. Any probability distribution over the original space de¯nes a
probability distribution over the di®erent k's. Label events so that K corresponds to
the largest bwk, K ¡ 1 to the second largest, and so on until event 1 corresponds to
the smallest bwk. By construction, K is the number of events the optimal contract is
contingent upon, and bw1 < bw2 < :: < bwK . We need to show K equals 2.
De¯ne e¢H ( bw) =
(






, and similarly for e¢L ( bw).
Let e±a denote an element of e¢a ( bw) for a = fH;Lg. By Proposition 2, bw must satisfy
KX
k=1
e±Hk bwk = w + cH (6)
We claim bw must also satisfy
KX
k=1










; bw2; ::; bwK¡1; bwK + "
¶
,
where " is positive and small enough so that the ranking of the payments for ew and bw
is the same. By Corollary 4, e±H and e±L minimize the expected value of ew for the agent.










± = e±H implies the right hand side of (8) is equal to 0; thus, ew satis¯es (6). For some "
close enough to zero and ± = e±L the right hand side of (8) is very small; thus ew satis¯es
(NC) because bw satis¯es it strictly. By Lemma 3 and A-1, e±HK < ¼HK and e±H1 ¸ ¼H1 ;
thus, the right hand side of (8) is negative when ± = ¼H . Summarizing, ew is feasible
and cheaper than bw, contradicting the optimality of bw. Hence (7) must hold for bw to
be an optimum.
We claim K must be strictly larger than 1. Suppose not, i.e., K = 1. If this is the
case, all payments are the same, and the left hand sides of equations (6) and (7) are
the same. Thus, we have w + cL = w + cH , contradicting cH > cL.
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We claim K is not larger than 2. Suppose not; then, bw is optimal and K > 2. bw
satis¯es Equations (6) and (7). These constitute a system of two equations which can






























e±LKe±Hk ¡ e±HK e±Lk
e±Lk0e±HK ¡ e±LKe±Hk0
bwk (10)
These are well de¯ned, unless
0 = e±LKe±Hk0 ¡ e±Lk0e±HK (11)















= e±LK ¡ e±HK
e±HK = e±LK





Thus, either 0 = e±HK = e±LK , or e±Hk0 = e±Lk0 for all k0 6= K. If the former happens, bw
cannot be optimal because it makes the largest payment in a state that does not a®ect
the constraints and, by A-2, has positive probability for the principal. If the latter






e±Lk bwk and cH = cL, a contradiction.


































e±HK ¡ ¼HK e±Hk0
e±Lk0e±HK ¡ e±LKe±Hk0
(13)
We claim that b̄k00 6= 0 for some k00 6= K;k0. Suppose not. Then, b̄k = 0 for each













e±HK ¡ ¼HK e±Hk0
´
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Summing over k, rearranging, and solving for ¼Hk0 :
¼Hk0 = ¡




































¢ > 0. Hence:
KX
k=1










< w + cH
a contradiction.
Because b̄k00 6= 0 for some k00 6= K;k0, we ¯nd a feasible contract which is cheaper
than bw. Let ew be de¯ned as follows: if b̄k00 > 0
ewk = bwk when k 6= K;k0; k00















ewk00 = bwk00 + "
where
j"j < min f bwk00 ¡ bwk00¡1; bwk00+1 ¡ bwk00 ; bwK ¡ bwK¡1; bwk0 ¡ bwk0¡1; bwk0+1 ¡ bwk0g
By construction, the payments in ew and bw are ranked in the same order. Corollary 4
applies, and e±H and e±L yield the lowest expected values of ew for H and L. Hence, we
know that, if one de¯nes e® and ē using (12) and (13), e® = b® and ē = b̄k. Moreover,
0 = e±LK
e±Hk0 e±Lk00 ¡ e±Hk00e±Lk0
e±Lk0e±HK ¡ e±LKe±Hk0
+ e±Lk0




e±Hk0 e±Lk00 ¡ e±Hk00e±Lk0
e±Lk0e±HK ¡ e±LKe±Hk0
+ e±Lk0
e±LKe±Hk00 ¡ e±HK e±Lk00
e±Lk0e±HK ¡ e±LKe±Hk0
+ e±Lk00
4 OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES ARE SIMPLE 19
Hence, ew is feasible because bw is. The expected cost of ew is given by
KX
k=1













k bwk + b̄k00"
Thus, we can choose " > 0 whenever b̄k00 < 0 and " < 0 whenever b̄k00 > 0. In
either case, ew is feasible and cheaper than bw, contradicting the optimality of the latter.
Summarizing, if an optimal contract is contingent on K > 2 events, we can ¯nd a
feasible contract which is cheaper. Therefore, because we already proved K < 2 is
impossible, a contract can be optimal only if K = 2.
Because there are N possible states and the optimal contract is two-valued, Propo-
sition 5 implies this contract can be found looking among 2N systems of two equations
in two unknowns. In the next chapter, we study the features of this optimal contract.
An interesting question for future research is how the principal selects among these 2N
possibilities.
The idea of the proof can be seen by looking at Figure 2. The agent's preferences are
represented by two cones. Each cone has at its vertex the status quo plus the cost of the
corresponding e®ort level. Contracts above the `°atter' cone, H, are contracts preferred
to the status quo plus the cost of high e®ort. Contracts below (or outside) the `steeper'
cone, L, are contracts at least non comparable to the status quo plus the cost of low
e®ort. Thus, the region above cone H and outside cone L represents contracts which
are feasible because they implement high e®ort according to De¯nition 2. Assumption
A-1 implies the edges of both cones are lines where two of the three payments are equal.
Assumption A-2 implies each hyperplane denoting the expected value of a contract for
the principal has a slope in between the three faces of cone H. The optimal incentive
scheme corresponds to the lowest of these hyperplanes still tangent to the region of
feasible contracts. The tangency occurs along one of the edges of cone H. Therefore,
the optimal contract is such that two of the three payments are equal.
The main step in the proof follows from the principal's cost hyperplanes not being
parallel to the agent's. If the principal's beliefs are not precise, these hyperplanes are
not unique. The main result might be una®ected as long as the principal displays less
Knightian uncertainty than the agent. That is, her beliefs though imprecise are more
precise than the agent's beliefs.
Assumptions A-1 and A-2 are crucial for the argument we developed. Without A-
1, one cannot say much about the agent's `extreme' expectations. Without A-2, one
cannot be sure the result holds in such a strong form. It could be the case that the
principal's expected cost of the contract equals the agent's extreme expectation. If this
is the case, uniqueness is lost. The following Proposition, though, provides a simple
example where a simplicity result is obtained anyway.


























Figure 2: Agent's Preferences in 3 Dimensions









j0 > 0. Then, there exists an optimal incentive scheme that pays the same
in all states but j0.
Proof. Such a scheme makes the contract conditional on two events which have precise,
i.e. unique, probabilities. Hence, by writing a contract contingent on j0 on one hand
and all states other than j0 on the other, the problem is reduced to the moral hazard
model with a risk neutral agent. The solution to this yields a contract which achieves
the ¯rst-best allocation.
Proposition 5 says the number of signals an optimal contract considers when the
agent chooses between two actions is the minimal number necessary to ¯nd feasible
contracts. In the case of two actions, this is exactly two. One possible generalization
could be to consider all actions without additional restrictions. If there are M pos-
sible actions there will be at most M binding constraints. From there on, one could
repeat a similar argument to the one we developed to show the optimal contract can be
contingent on at most M events. A di®erent way to proceed is to ask when the same
two-wage structure is optimal regardless of the number of actions. This is done in the
next section.
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4.2 Simplicity with many actions
In this Section we provide conditions under which optimal incentive schemes are simple
when the agent chooses among many actions. These conditions reduce the many-action
case to the two-action case. The exercise parallels what is done to obtain monotonic-
ity (in output) of the optimal contract in the standard model. Not surprisingly, the
requirements are similar.
Suppose the constraint corresponding to only one alternative action binds at the
optimum. Then, the solution to the two-action problem in which this action is the only
alternative also solves the more general problem. Therefore, the following proposition
provides assumptions such that there is only one action whose constraint binds.
Proposition 7 Let monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) and concavity of the distribution
function (CDFC) hold for all extreme points of the agent's belief sets. Then, the optimal
contract to implement an action a¤ according to De¯nition 2 has a two-wage structure.11
Proof.
Let bw be the optimal contract, and let e¢( bw; ¢) and e±a be as de¯ned previously.
Without loss of generality, label payments so that bwN corresponds to the highest bwN¡1
to the second highest and so on. We claim there exists only one action a0 di®erent
from a¤ whose constraint binds at e±a0 , and a0 < a¤. Suppose not. Then, there exist
two actions a0 and a00 di®erent from a¤ such that
PN
j=1











e±a¤j bwj ¡ ca
¤
= w. By construction e±a¤ ,e±a0 , and e±a00 are extreme points of
the corresponding belief sets. From here on, one can exactly follow the argument in
Grossman and Hart [1983] to get the claim. If only the constraint relative to one action
binds, bw must also be optimal in a problem where all other actions are dropped from the
constraints. Therefore, Proposition 5 applies to that problem and the optimal contract
has a two-wage structure.
Interestingly, a su±cient condition to reduce the multi-action case to the two-action
case is a generalized version of the requirement one needs in the standard model to
obtain monotonicity in output of the optimal contract. In our framework, though, this
has nothing to do with output. As we show in the next section, in our framework the
optimal contract is not necessarily monotone even if there are only two actions and two
states.
5 The Two State Case
In this section, we specialize the model to the case where only two output levels are
possible and the agent can choose between two actions. Because in the general case the








is decreasing in i. CDFC holds if
for any three actions a00; a0; a such that ca = ¸ca
0












i for all j.
5 THE TWO STATE CASE 22
optimal contract is contingent on only two events, this section can be thought of as a
reduced form of that problem.
We look at the two event version of the model to ask more detailed questions about
the contract. How much ine±ciency is caused by imprecision in the agent's beliefs?
Does this ine±ciency depend on whether the agent's behavior conforms to the inertia
assumption? How does the optimal contract in our model di®er from the optimal in-
centive scheme in the standard model? We answer these questions ¯rst in the general
case, and then by looking at a particular speci¯cation of the model where imprecision
is constant across actions. This example can be thought as describing Knightian uncer-
tainty which depends only on the environment the agent operates in, and is not a®ected
by his actions.
Finally, we show that with inertia, we show the agent is unwilling to buy the ¯rm
from the principal at a price the principal would accept. Thus, contrary to the standard
model, the agency problem cannot be avoided even if the agent is risk-neutral and has
unlimited wealth. This result suggests a possible theory of the ¯rm. Firm owners
(principals) are the individuals who face less Knightian uncertainty. Workers (agents)
are the individuals who face more Knightian uncertainty.
5.1 Optimal Contract with Two Output Levels
Notation is as follows. There are only two output levels y1 and y2, with y2 > y1. Thus,
we refer to state 2 as the good state. The agent has only two actions to choose from,
high and low e®ort denoted H and L respectively. High e®ort is more costly, cH > cL.
Because there are only two states, we can describe the agent's beliefs as probability






with a equal to either H or L.
One can characterize the agent's beliefs according their relative position under the
two di®erent actions according to the following de¯nition.


















































Figure 3 shows examples of these cases. Notice that the intervals are disjoint when
the agent's beliefs are extremely optimistic or pessimistic. If beliefs are less uncertain,
the agent feels he has more control over the production process by choosing high e®ort.
That is, his beliefs are more precise, and his probability interval shrinks. The relative
position of the agent's belief in°uence the solution to the principal's problem. If they
are optimistic, the payment the agent receives in the good state is higher. If they are
pessimistic, the payment he receives in that state is lower. If they are less uncertain,
depending on the position of the principal's beliefs relative to his, the agent receives
payments as if he were optimistic or pessimistic.


















































































Figure 3: Characterization of the Agent's Beliefs
We solve explicitly for the optimal incentive scheme in a two-state version of our
model. As a reminder, we state the two de¯nitions of implementation and the principal's
problem.
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2 w2 ¡ cH ¸ w (P)




































2 w2 ¡ cL · w (NC)
Let H1 be the set of all schemes which satisfy De¯nition 4, and H2 the set of all
schemes which satisfy De¯nition 5. As a consequence of the disjoint belief sets condition




2 . On the other hand, H2 is
















where i = f1; 2g. An optimal incentive scheme bwi is a solution to this problem.
The optimal schemes di®er if the agent's behavior displays inertia or not and, in
the ¯rst case, if di®erent assumptions about his beliefs are made. In both cases, the
optimal contract is described by the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Assume each Hi is not empty and the principal's beliefs are a member
of each of the agent's belief sets. Then, the optimal incentive scheme without inertia is:
bw1=
0
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±H2 ¡±L2
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Proof.
Because there are only two actions, Proposition ?? implies both constraints under
De¯nition 4 are binding when computed according to the extreme expectations. Because
there are only two states, the smallest (largest) expected value is reached by putting as
much weight as possible on the smallest (largest) payment. These constitute a system
of two equations in two unknowns, and bw1 is the solution to this system. A similar
argument applies for bw2, taking into account that during the proof of Proposition 5 we
showed that the non-comparability constraint must bind at the optimum. There may
be two contracts that solve the system constituted by (P ) and (NC), according to the
relative positions of the action's respective belief intervals. In this case, the principal
chooses the cheapest of these two feasible schemes depending on the position of her
beliefs relative to the agent's.
bw2 is not necessarily monotone in output. Intuitively, when the agent's beliefs are
less uncertain high e®ort has two consequences. It increases the lowest expectation of
the contract the agent can compute, but also reduces the highest expectation of that
same contract. If the agent's beliefs are pessimistic, he thinks the bad state is relatively
more likely when he works hard, so he is paid relatively more in that state. If, instead,
the agent's beliefs are less uncertain, and the principal's are relatively optimistic, she
thinks the good state is very likely, and pays the agent relatively less in that state.
bw1 is always monotone in output because the agent's beliefs are extremely optimistic
for H1 not to be empty. This is true for bw2only if the agent's beliefs are optimistic, or the
agent's beliefs are less uncertain and the principal's beliefs are pessimistic. The agent
is paid more in the bad state when he thinks the bad state is more likely (pessimistic
beliefs); or when he thinks the good state is less uncertain and the principal thinks the
good state is very likely. In both cases, neither side of the contract likes monotonicity.
Neither optimal contract depends on the principal's beliefs. Therefore, it is robust
to some imprecision in them, as long as this does not change the action she wants to
implement, or the choice between the two possible contracts when the agent's beliefs
are less uncertain. Neither optimal contract depends on the amount of uncertainty the
agent faces (the length of the probability intervals), but rather on the di®erence between
the agent's worst expectation when he works hard and one of the extreme expectations
when he does not work hard.
Figure 4 represents the principal's problem when the agent does not obey the in-
ertia assumption. The agent's preferences are represented by one cone for each action.
Contracts inside cone H are preferred to the status quo when the agent works hard.
The status quo is preferred to contracts inside cone L when the agent does not work
hard. Thus, H1 is the region where these two overlap. The principal's preferences are
represented by a family of lines which have slope in between the slopes of the sides of
the cone H. The intersection between the lowest of these lines and H1 identi¯es the
(unique) optimal scheme bw1.
Inspection of Figure 4 reveals that the expected cost of bw1depends negatively on the
upper probability of the good state induced by L and positively on the lower probability
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payment in the bad state
payment in the good state
W*
Agent's preferences when H is chosen







Figure 4: The Optimal Incentive Scheme with Multiple Beliefs
of the good state induced by H. Furthermore, if the belief sets corresponding to the two
actions are not disjoint, one can see that the hatched region in the diagram is empty,
and there are no contracts which implement H.
Figure 5 represents the principal's problem when the agent obeys the inertia assump-
tion. The agent's preferences are represented by one cone for each action. Contracts
inside cone H are preferred to the status quo when the agent works hard. Contracts
outside cone L are (at least) not comparable to the status quo when the agent does
not work hard. Thus, H2 is composed of the two regions where these two overlap. The
principal's preferences are represented by a family of lines which have slopes in between
the slopes of the sides of cone H. The intersection between the lowest of these lines
and H2 identi¯es the (unique) optimal scheme bw2.
Figure 5 also displays the principal's choice when the agent's beliefs are less un-
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Figure 5: The Optimal Incentive Scheme with Uncertainty Aversion
certain, and the fact that when the agent's beliefs are either optimistic or pessimistic,
one of the two regions that compose H2 is empty. Inspection of Figure 4 reveals that
the expected cost of bw2 depends negatively on the lower probability of the good state
induced by L, and positively on the lower probability of the good state induced by H.
From the previous diagrams, one can see how relaxing some assumptions would
change the optimal contract. If the agent's cost of performing each action and/or the
status quo are random, the position of the two cones would di®er: their vertices would
no longer be on the 450 line. If the agent is risk-averse, the cones have non-linear
boundaries.
5.2 Comparisons with the Standard Model
We compare our model to the version of the standard framework in which the agent
is risk-neutral. This comparison is interesting because the principal can implement
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high e®ort at the ¯rst-best cost, even though the optimal contract is not unique. In
the previous Chapter, we showed that in our framework the optimal incentive scheme
is uniquely determined when the agent is risk-neutral. This constitutes the major
di®erence between the model with risk-neutrality and precise beliefs and our model.
Now, we proceed to measure the e±ciency loss due to imprecision.
5.2.1 The Cost of Imprecision
When the principal can observe the agent's actions, our model agrees with the standard
model in predicting that CFB(a) = w+ca. When the agent's actions are not observable,
the cost of the second-best incentive scheme is de¯ned to be:




Unobservability matters only if CFB(a) and Ci(a) di®er. In our model, this is the case
because the principal and the agent do not have the same attitude toward uncertainty.
Hence, they disagree on the contract's value. Imprecision of the agent's beliefs makes
implementing high e®ort more costly for the principal.
Proposition 9 The second-best optimal incentive scheme is more costly than the ¯rst
best.
Proof. We need to show Ci(H) ¸ CFB(H) for i = f1; 2g. Using the formulas for bwi,
we obtain:

































When H1 is not empty, the denominator in (16) is positive. Moreover, because ¼H2
is a member of ¢H , the numerator is positive. Hence, C1(H) ¸ CFB(H). When H2 is
not empty, the denominators in (17) are positive. Moreover, because ¼H2 is a member
of ¢H , the numerators are positive. Hence, C2(H) ¸ CFB(H).
C1(H) = CFB(H) if and only if ¼H2 = ±
H
2 . Therefore, unless the probability the
principal assigns to state 2 is equal to the lower probability the agent assigns to it, bw1
does not achieve ¯rst-best cost. The di®erence between Ci(H) and CFB(H) measures
the e±ciency loss due to imprecision. This is always positive, except in the special





2 . The e±ciency loss increases with the probability the principal assigns to the
good state, because that is the state to which the agent assigns lower probability and
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he needs larger incentives in that state. The e±ciency loss increases with the upper
probability the agent assigns to the good state when he does not work hard, because
this makes high e®ort less attractive to him.






2 , depending on which
solution has to be considered. Except in this special case, the e±ciency loss due to
imprecision is always positive. The comparative statics of C2(H) are more complicated
because the contract is not necessarily monotone in output. If the optimal scheme is
monotone, results are as before. If the optimal scheme is not monotone, the e±ciency
loss decreases with the probability the principal assigns to the good state and with
the upper probability the agent assigns to the good state when low e®ort is chosen,
and increases with the upper probability when high e®ort is chosen. These results are
implied by the fact that now the contract pays more in the bad state, and the upper
probabilities of this state correspond to the lower probabilities of the bad state.
From equations (16) and (17), one can verify the principal would rather employ
an agent who obeys the inertia assumption than one who does not.12 This is obvious
since, as seen in Figure 6, H1 is a subset of H2. Intuitively, an agent who does not
obey the inertia assumption threatens to take the wrong action more easily, and thus is
more costly for the principal. In other words, the inertia assumption helps the principal
because it diminishes the appeal alternative actions have for the agent. Inertia means
reluctance to abandon the status quo. Thus, the agent's conservatism prevents him
from threatening to choose the low e®ort action.
Less obviously, the inertia assumption damages the agent. Let ±H be a generic




























Summarizing, imprecision of the agent's beliefs is always bad news for the principal.
The high e®ort action is more expensive to implement than if she could observe the
agent's e®ort choice. This loss is mitigated when the principal's beliefs happen to be
close to the agent's extreme beliefs about the least likely state. And it disappears if
these two are the same. On the other hand, if we think of the agent's beliefs as imprecise
around the principal's beliefs, the loss in e±ciency is always positive.
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Implement H for 
Definition 2
Figure 6: The Di®erence between De¯nition 4 and De¯nition 5
5.3 An Example: Constant Imprecision
As an example of the di®erent way in which imprecision a®ects the e±ciency of the
optimal contract, one can look at the case in which imprecision is constant. That is, the
amount of imprecision in the agent's beliefs does not depend on the action he chooses.
We think of this situation as lack of con¯dence independent of the agent's actions.13








2 ¡ ". By construction, this
model represents the case where the agent's beliefs are optimistic. The constraint set
for the problem without inertia is non-empty as long as " <
¼H2 ¡¼L2
2 .
13This is called a `contagion' probability model. For an axiomatic justi¯cation of the relevance of this
probability model in a similar setting see Mukerji [1994].
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In this case, the optimal contracts without and with inertia are:
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¼H2 ¡ ¼L2 ¡ 2"











¼H2 ¡ ¼L2 ¡ 2"
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Imprecision a®ects the optimal contract symmetrically. Intuitively, this is be-
cause, by assumption, imprecision does not depend on the action the agent
chooses. Therefore, relative to the standard case, it does not introduce additional
incentive problems.
First, we look at the cost of implementing the high e®ort action. In this case,
(16) and (17) reduce to:
C1(H) = w + cH +
"




























which is always positive and constant. Then, with and without inertia the e±-
ciency loss increases with the amount of imprecision, but in the latter case the
rate is constant while in the former is increasing. Without inertia, one can easily
see how imprecision may make it very unpro¯table for the principal to implement
the high e®ort action when imprecision is very large.
We now look at the actual form of the contract. Before proceeding, we need to
rewrite the optimal contract in a form that makes the comparison easier. When
there are only two states, any contract can be described by a ¯xed payment and
a share of realized output. Let f be the ¯xed amount and s the share of realized
output. Then, for any contract w = w1; w2, we have
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Using the formula above, one can easily determine the optimal ¯xed payments
in the standard model and in our model without and with inertia as:



















































An agent whose beliefs are imprecise receives a higher base payment; further-
more, the ¯xed payment increases with the amount of imprecision faced by the
agent. Without inertia, the share of output is higher than in the standard model,
and increases with imprecision. With inertia, the share of realized output does not
depend on imprecision, and is equal to the one in the standard model. Therefore,
in this case the main e®ect of imprecision is to require a higher base payment to
the agent. Intuitively, because imprecision of beliefs is independent of the agent's
choice, the incentive part of the contract is una®ected. This result does not hold
without inertia, because the agent evaluates probabilities asymmetrically. These
results are similar to the ¯nding in Beaudry [1994]. There, the increase in the
base payment is due to the desire of the principal to signal superior information
to the agent.
Summarizing, in the special case where the agent's Knightian uncertainty does
not depend on the e®ort choice, the loss in e±ciency of the optimal contract
is always positive, and increasing with imprecision of the agent's beliefs. The
optimal contract requires a higher base payment, while the payment dependent
on realized output may be una®ected.
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5.4 Ownership of the Production Process
We conclude this section analyzing whether risk aversion and/or wealth con-
straints are necessary for moral hazard to force a second best allocation. In any
principal-agent model, the moral hazard problem can be avoided if the principal
and the agent are willing to exchange ownership of the production process. After
the transaction, the inability of the principal to observe the agent's action is no
longer a factor, and the ¯rst best can be achieved. In the standard model, if the
agent is risk-neutral and has enough wealth, this transaction is possible.
In our model, even though the agent is risk-neutral and no wealth constraint is
imposed, there is no price both parties would accept to exchange the production
process if the agent's behavior displays inertia. Knightian uncertainty aversion
provides an additional rationale for the existence of agency relationships. The
possible gain from trade is measured by the di®erence in the cost of implementing
H for the two parties. This di®erence is never large enough to compensate for
the fact that the principal and the agent do not agree on the value of the ¯rm.
Hence, the transaction will never take place. The following proposition states the
result.
Proposition 10 Suppose the agent obeys the inertia assumption, and an optimal
incentive scheme exists. Then, the lowest price the principal is willing to accept
to sell the ¯rm to the agent is higher than the highest price the agent is willing to
pay.
The intuition for the proof relies on the idea that the two parties do not agree
on what the ¯rm is worth. In addition, the agent buys the ¯rm only if doing so
is preferred to the status quo. These two observations imply there is no price at
which the agent is willing to buy and the principal is willing to sell.
Proof.
The proof is extremely cumbersome because we need to take into account the
fact that the agent may choose a di®erent action after he acquires the ¯rm. We
need to show there is no trading price for the ¯rm. The agent buys the ¯rm only
if there exists an action a such that, for all ±a 2 ¢a
E±a [y]¡ ca ¡ P ¸ w
where P is the price he pays for the ¯rm, and a is either H or L. Because y2 > y1,
this condition is satis¯ed if and only if it holds for ±a = (1¡ ±a2; ±a2). Let P a be
the highest price the agent would pay for the ¯rm. This is:
P a = (1¡ ±a2) y1 + ±a2y2 ¡ ca ¡ w
The principal sells if and only if she receives at least her valuation of the ¯rm.
This is the di®erence between the expected value of output and the expected cost
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of implementing action H. That is:
E¼H [y]¡ C2(H)
We need to show that P a < E¼H [y]¡ C2(H). Suppose not. Then,
P a ¸ E¼H [y]¡ C2(H) (21)
Depending on the action the agent may take, and the di®erent beliefs of the two
parties, we have several cases.












2 y2 ¡ C2(H) (22)
CASE L-1:
The agent's beliefs are optimistic; or they are less uncertain, and the principal's




¸ y2 ¡ y1 (23)
If the principal prefers to implement H, we have:
y2 ¡ y1 >





which proves (23) does not hold.
CASE L-2:
The agent's beliefs are pessimistic; or they are less uncertain, and the princi-
pal's beliefs are relatively optimistic. Substituting C2(H) from equation (17) and
rearranging, (22) yields:






¸ (¼H2 ¡ ±L2 )(y2 ¡ y1) (24)
If the principal prefers to implement H, and ±L2 · ¼L2 , we have:
(¼H2 ¡ ±L2 )(y2 ¡ y1) > (¼H2 ¡ ¼L2 )(y2 ¡ y1) ¸






which proves (24) does not hold.












2 y2 ¡ C2(H) (25)
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CASE H-1:
The agent's beliefs are optimistic; or they are less uncertain, and the principal's




¸ y2 ¡ y1
which cannot hold because of CASE L-1.
CASE H-2:
The agent's beliefs are pessimistic; or they are less uncertain, and the princi-
pal's beliefs are relatively optimistic. Substituting C2(H) from equation (17) and
rearranging, (25) yields:






¸ (¼H2 ¡ ±H2 )(y2 ¡ y2) (26)
We must distinguish two subcases.
4a The agent's beliefs are pessimistic. Because the principal prefers to im-





(¼H2 ¡ ±H2 )(y2 ¡ y1) > (¼H2 ¡ ¼L2 )(y2 ¡ y1) ¸






which proves (26) does not hold.
4b The agent's beliefs are less uncertain and the principal's beliefs are rel-
atively optimistic. Because the principal prefers to implement H:
(¼H2 ¡ ±H2 )(y2 ¡ y1) ¸
(¼H2 ¡ ±H2 )(±
L
2 ¡ ¼H2 )(cH ¡ cL)






If the principal is relatively optimistic, (±
H
2 ¡ ¼H2 )(¼H2 ¡ ¼L2 ) < (¼H2 ¡
±H2 )(±
L
2 ¡ ¼H2 );. Thus (26) does not hold.
We ruled out all possible cases, thus, the agent never prefers buying the ¯rm
to the status quo, and the proof is complete.
6 Conclusions
In some agency situations, the agent may not feel as con¯dent as the principal in
evaluating uncertainty. For example, the agent may be an outsider who does not
control all aspects of the production process. If this is the case, the agent lacks
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con¯dence about his in°uence on the possible output outcomes. This aspect
of agency relationships has been generally neglected in economic theory. The
framework we adopt is useful to introduce robustness requirements for optimal
contracts.
In this setting, an incentive scheme is robust by de¯nition. We showed how
the main consequence of this demand for robustness is simplicity of the optimal
contract. Furthermore, if the agent's behavior displays inertia, the moral hazard
problem cannot be solved by selling the ¯rm to the agent. Contrary to the
standard model, this result holds in spite of the agent's being risk-neutral and
having unlimited wealth.
The last result we derived states an agent who has multiple beliefs will not
buy the ¯rm from the principal. This has an interesting implication if interpreted
as theory of the ¯rm. A division of tasks where the individual who faces more
Knightian uncertainty is the residual claimant is in some sense e±cient. Our
model suggest a description of the ¯rm like Knight's [1921]. Entrepreneurs are
individuals who perceives the business as risky, while workers perceive it as un-
certain. One direction for future research is to check whether this separation of
tasks obtains in a model where individuals can choose their occupation.
To our knowledge, this paper represents the ¯rst attempt to explicitly use an
incomplete preferences framework in an economic model. This approach seems
particularly appropriate when individuals do not have exact knowledge about the
stochastic properties of variables relevant to their decision making process. By
taking this into account we can explain why optimal contracts are simple.
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